Small Enterprises and the Crisis in Indian Development
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA claims that it has supportedthe development of small enterprises, both through the creation of specific organisations which provide technical and organisational aid and through financial provisions for them in the various five year plans. To understand fully the basis and accuracy of these claims, it is important to appreciate the economic aud political background within which the Government's aid programmes were initiated. This will also allow us to understand the genesis of the Government's conception of small enterprises.
It is a widely held view that planning in India consists essentially of five year plans, which are in the nature of technical exercises. In fact, the planning process should correctly be seen as a much broader and as an emphatically political process.1 The crucial aspect of the nature of planning in India lies in the concept of the capitalist economy, in which the laws of capitalist development must inevitably make themselves felt (i e, the acceptance of private property in the means of production and the institutions based on this). It is often stated not only in government publications but in many other writings on the Indian economy and society that India has "opted" for a mixed economy, i e, the coexistence of the private sector with the publc sector.2 It is not made clear by these writers, however, by whom and how this type of economy was "opted" for.
In fact, it had been shown that as early as 1940, the majority of the joint stock companies operating in India were in the hands of a few British and Indian managing agency houses.3 It was these powerful economic interests that effectively controlled the industrial economy of India. During the Second World War, Indian irldustrialists were able to accumulate substantial amounts of capital. This was used in the years leading upto Independence to buy out some British managing NASIR TYABJI* in India at that time. Although there were, of course, many more corZ porate enterprises apparently independent of these powerful economic interests, their average size would not have been more than Rs 7 lakhs in terms of paid up capital.S The point to be emphasised, therefo,e. is that while independance meant the transfer of "political" power to the Congress, it also meAnt the transfer of "economic" power to the big Indian indrlstrialists and agricultural landlords.6 It is important to remember that while 30me of these industrialists had played a prominent role, directly or indirectly, in the national movement, they constituted the oligarchic bloc in planning bodies.7 It is thus unlikely that any other than a "mixed?' pattern of economy could have been "opted" for, given thb high degree of concentration of industrial assets in private llarlds, and the decision making power flowing from this.8 On the other hand, public enterprises in areas involving high risks and long gestation periods were required for the growth of enterprises controlled by large industrialists. Popular sentiment in favour of the public sector gexlerated during pre-Independence debates was skilfully used to justify investments in such strategic industries .9
Encouragement to Small Enterprises 'rhere was a socio-political as well as economic imperative for the conscious encouragement of snlall enterprises.
The high degree of concentration of capital in the Indian economy at the time of lndependence led to a serious situation as far as the stability of the existing social order was concerned. Property distribution in India was, as figures for capital concentration show, extremely skewed, with only a minute fraction of the Irldian population in osvnership of industrial assets. Added to this was a situation where the country had achieved independence under the pressure of a mass national movement. Although never seriously challenging the legitimacy of institutions of private property, this had generated and disseminated democratic ideas. viewing unfavourably the existence of extreme concentrations of income and wealth.10 For the continuance and further development of the capitalist social order bequeathed by British colonialism to the leader3 of the Congress-the rnajor organi.sed corlstituent of the national movement-it ssas essential, if IlOt to <listribute existing industrial and agricultural assets, at least to encourage the growtll of nulnerous smaller property holders. l l
The economic imperative facing the planners arcsc from tile high degree of self-employment in the economy. According to the 19o1 population census, over 58 per cent of the ssulk force engaged in industry "neither emplofred any one nor did they u-ork for anyone".12 If thc mass of productive facilities already existing at tlle tiIne of independencc werc to expand and grow, it was critical that the market for the gocuds which they produced should also grow. The good3 produced in industrial establishments can be broadly classified into (1) those which are consumed directly; (2) those that are used in the manufacture of other articles (intermediate goods); and (3) the capital goods on which all these articles are manufactured. It is one of the laws of the development of economy that the market for irltermediate goods and capital goods must increase at a faster rate than the market for consumer goods.13 TO generate a fast growing market for capital goods and intermeliate goods, it was necessary for tlle planners to encollrage a process of capital accumulation, leading to difTerentiation among the huge mass of self-errlployed persons.
Under the lass7s of capitalist competition, a sm<all minority of these self-employed persons was to be expected to develop into a stratum (f relatively small industrial entreprenours. The large majority would inevitably lose the little property they held, and enter the work force as wage workers. Processes in the agricultural sector similar to that of diSerentiation of the self-employed industrial workers described above were expected to take place simultaneously.:4 Thus, both the sociopolitical irnperative of the development of a small industrial capitalist stratum, and the economic imperative of the encouragement of small industrial enterprises pointed to the need for a set of official policy measures and institutions which would aid these processes. Both these requirements of capitali st economic development flowed out of the condition of the Indian economy at tiIne. \Shat is of interest in the Indian case, however, is that these requirements collld be skillfully matched to the popular support for small industrialists and small enterprises which had been generated by democratic currents within the Congress itself in tile pre-Independence period. Right wing and left wing elements within the Congress had debated the roles of the private and the public sectors, of large and small enterprises, and the content of post-Indeperldence economic planning in the pre-Independence period . l s As a result of immediate post-lnclependence cont.roversies, however, the plans of the left wing in the Congress for natioalisation of all large enterprises were diluted to measures for governmental regulation16 of initiation, expansion, and change of location c)f large industrial enterprises. the last named for the purpose of avoiding geographical coneentration of industrial development. 'lEhe 1951 Industrial Development and Regulation Act (IDRA) whiszll was, and is, the chief administrative instrument of industrial planners, defined the size of the enterprise which wotlld come under its purview, and also defined (by exclusion) enterprises which would be free of such legulations. This eselllded sector came to be known officially as modern small enterprise sector.
Tn 1954, tlie office of the Development Commissioner, Small Scale Industries, svas estlblished in the Ministry of Industry in Delhi as the admirlistratie agency resporlsible for planning and rnonitoring programmes for the developnaent of small enterprises. In 1955, the National Small Industries Corporation was established to look after commercial prograrnmes (such as the supply of machinery on hirepurchase, and the development of marketing channels) for small enterprises. In the subsequent years, each of tile State Governments established its own corporation to develop small enteprises, in addition to the State Financial Corporations which provided financial asbsistance to small and medium enterprises.
At the present time, tile governmerlt defines a small enterprise as one in which the cost to the owner of the plant and machinery installed is less than Rs 20 lakhs. In fact, from 1960, the Government has been deEning small enterprises solely on the basis of the value of ISxed capital, and later, in plant and equipment. Ostensibly because of the rising costs of plant arld machinery due to inflation, the defining limit has been raised from time to time. This definition refers to what are known as modern small enterprises which can be found on the outskirts of most large cities, or on industrial estates. In addition, there are enterprises involved in handloom weaving, khadi, and some other traditional village occupations, which should also form part of a discussion of small enterprises.
Concentration and Centralisation
'The institutions for the development of small enterprises which have been described are, therefore, the results of the economic and political requirements of a capitalist development strategy based on direct administrative intervention, on the one hand, and also the reflection of the democratic currents within the nationalist movement led by big capitalists, on the other. These institutions operate within the context of an economy subject to the laws of capatalist development, and it is to the eSects of these laws that nve now turn.
It has earlier been pointed out that under the pressure of capitalist competition, a process of diSerentiation takes place amongst the mass of small producers, leading to the emergence of a small propertied stratum and a large mass of wage workers. This process of dispossession on the one hand, and of property accumulation on the other, is an intrinsic part of the process of capitalist accumulation, or concentration, in the early stages of capitalist development. Simultaneously with this process of concentration of individual capitals, there is another process known as centralisation.l7 This process is commonly observed in the form of merger of pre-existing enterprises, and involves the coming together of capitals already in existence. Larger and larger pools of capital are formed very swiftly by the process oc centralisation which takes place particularly rapidly during periods of economic crisis when capitalist enterplises are "ratiollalised" or zveeded out.
The stock exchanges in the country serve as another important means of centralisation; thes help to pool capital held in various froms and even the savings of middle class sections of society, which are then utilised by the controllers of large joint stock companies. Under the pressure of capitalist competition and the laws of concentration and centralisation, an enterprise must either grow in size continuously, or collapse sooner c)r later. Tt cannot remain stagnant in size. As the centralisation of capital increases, there is less and less rooin within the economy for new capitalist interests to operate. The restllt is that most of the small enterprises will fail to ISnd a permanent place for themselves in the economy, and will be forszed out of business sooner or later.
However, there can occasionally be short lived exceptions to this general rule. In the years following Independen(:e, the shortage of foreign exchange led to restrictions on imports. In addition, encouraged by the brief thrust of the second five year plan strategy of self-reliant growth, many small enterprises did develop to fill in the gap left by import restrictions. Production of some articles of every day use such as kitchen utensils, cutlery, fountain pens, and plasticware began in small enterprises. Continuing demand for these products led to the growth of a certain number of these small enterprises.
Economic Logic and Crisis of Small Enterprises
Predictably, by the beginning of the third five year plan, and particularly after the eccBnomic crisis of the middle 1960s, the prospects for small enterprises have been increasingly unfavourable. Partly as a reslllt of the inability to find "space" for new small enterprises in the economy, and partly as a result of mecting the pressure from big industrialists (which we shall discuss later), the Government has from the time of the third five year plan (1961-66) put some emphasis on the development of ancillaries amongst small enterprises.18 They were expected to survive on the basis of assured markets mainly provided by large enterprises.
The question that arises is how assured these markets really are Broadly speaking, a small enterprise can undertake three kinds of work, It may operate purely a.s a subcontractor on raw materials provided by the customer; it may manufacture an item to the long or short term order of another (usually larger) enterprise; or it may manufacture the item for direct sale on the market. Generally, both the subcontracting enterprises and those making a product to the order of other enterprises are known as ancillaries. In these cases, it can be seexl that the small enterprise has no separate economic existence.
It merely embodies a segment of the prodllction process which has been separated from and apparerltly under the controI of the large enterprise. lhe absence of possitJilities of independent existence of these ancillary units makes them subject to a variety of pressures by their large customers. Particularly at tiales oI recession in the cconomy, involvinga credit squeeze, the larber ellterprises attempt to improve their cash flow position by delaying payments. CCut throat competition between competing ancillaries drives the price of the goods often to the level of prixne cost of production. The general existence of such conditions creates relationships of further dependence of the small entrepreneur on his big customer The situation is little, if at a11, better for small enterprises maliing Snal products for the market. In the majoritv of cases, these enterprises face extreme competition from estalJlished 3arge enterprises under the control of transnational monopolies and indigenous lDig business groups .1 9 It must be noted that tIaere .lre no economies of large scale production to be gained (e g, in tlae case of msltches5 toothpaste7 and many other items) where the branded prodx( ts of transnatio1lal alld big Indian enterprises are hou.sellold words. TIlese large enterprises retain their dominant position by their control over raw material supplies, and especially by the enormous resources invesled in the distrlbution and "maI keting" networks extending even to the most remote village retailer.20 It must be emphasised, therefole, that the large si7:e of these enterprises, and the very high rates of profit which they earn, are a resuIt of their monopolistic position, and in no sense an indication of their efficiency of operation. .N fraction of tllese profits are passed onto the "sole" retailers in the fortn of high discotlnts, thlls ensul-illg that competingproductsofsrtlall ellterprises, eveniftheyare cheaper, find few outlets.2t
The fact that large foreign arAd indigenous indust..rial illterests earn high profits by their operation, does not lneKln at all that tlley have no interest in the smaIl enterprises field. As an unregulated sector, the small enterprises fieId allow them, tlough the development of benami ancillaries, to increase the capacity of their large enterprises beyond that licensed to them under IDRA. Tilev are able to make use of the credit extended by the nationalised banks, under conditions where banks are eager to achiexZe bank lending norms to the "priority sector" of which small enterprises form a component. They can provide comfortalJle jobs to members of tile extended families (which fortn the sociological core of the big business groups) and provide patronage to loyal ex-employees .2 2 T11us it is clear that tSle issue of aid to the ss11tt11 entreprez1eur lerslls aicl to thessnall enterprise is crucial both to the continuance of the progrssxlzne a7Z{ foz the correct adentification oJ beneficiaries.
Struggle for Survival
This intiltration of the small enterprise prorarnlne by established interests is an expre3sion of the clash between tzxro forces: the oligarchic one3 (desiring merely the extension of the capitalist market for the means of prodllction through the creation of smsll enterprises) and the democratic onesdbsiiitlg the safebuard of the.r income earning opportunities throush the creation of small enterprises independent of 4l monopolistic interests.
There have been a number of situations in the past which have shown attempts by oligarchic and dernocratic forces to gain control of the programme. Prominent amongst the democratic currents was the appointment of the A R Bhat Committee to formulate legislation in support of the small enterprises programrne.23 lwhe small entrepreneur merrlbers of the committee suggested that a small entreprise be defined in relationship to the size of the total capital owned by an interest in all the enterprises corltrolled by it. In otherwords, they sought to remove the phenolnenon of multiple ownership of small enterprises, and ty extension, the owership Of such enterprises by large indv1strial interests.
There was determined opposition to this from the majority of the commiLtee drawn from the administration, and from among professional chartered accountants, both of whom represented big capitalist interests. Under the circumstances, the chairman himself (who, it must be noted, was not an entrepreneur himself, big or small) and the minority of the comxllittee presellted this suggestion in the form of a rninute of dissent to the main report.
However, it is clear that the conteIlt of the legislation proposed in the main report potentially jeopardised big industrial interests. Althougll the report was submitted to the Government of India in 1972, st is still oHicially "under consideration". This incident illustrates the temporary assertion by democratic interests, expressed in the very formation of the Comtnittee and in some of its recommendations. On the other handX the Government's silence oil the issue since 1972 shows the long term triumph of big industrial interests.
On another occasion, the democratic forces ensured that the officialdefinitionof therelationship betweenanancillary unit andits large customer made it explicitly clear that the contract between the two was to be fair to both parties.24 However, this was an unrealistic expectation, given the present day circumstance. Through the expedient of refusing to acknowledge enterprises which were in fact serving as their ancillaries, t}1e atlenlpt of the democratic forces, thQugh worth nothing, was sidetracked.
Finally, me1ltioil rnay be madeof arecent move to modify 1DRA in order to bring the concept of reservation of itemes for exclusive production by small enterprises onto a 1)asis acceptable to the courts.25 This follows a decision of the Bornbay High Court which held that the administrative order reserving items could IlOt be sustained under legal scrutiny.26 rrhese are all exarnples of attempts by delnocratic forces to strengthen the srnall cllterpl ises developnsent programt.ne in the interest of the small entrepreneur.
On the olller hand, large industrial interests have attempted by all possible means to ensure that the government programme, as an institutiont contirlues to serve their long term interests. They, however, thwart the operalion of the provisions which assist small individual entrepreneurs to develop into a competing body, or a stratum independdent of them. It is precisely this opposition that manifests big capitalist domination responsible for the collapse of many small enterprises.
Apart frotn the so-called modern small enterprises, there are two other kinds of stnall enterprises rhich require consideration. The first of these consists of enterprises in the textile industry using handlooms and powerlooms. These enterprises which are concentrated specifica]ly in blalaarashtra and ramil N^ldu, are peculiar in that they represent productiorl processes of a traditional nalure which have been modified selectil.ely. They are major providers of employment, particularl irl Talmil Nadll and their products need to be protected from the competition of the products of the large scale integrated textile enterpri ses .
The second kind of small enterprises which, in general, is more of a traditional techrlological nature lies under the purviess of the Khadi and Village Industries (::ommission (KVIC). In its search to generate incomeearning opportunities on a large scale in the rural areas, the Commission's activilies are particularly important in drawing womcn of the Scheduled Castes into regular paid employment. Althowlgh the KVIC has managed, through its programme, to cover a negligible fraction of these sections, its scileme for the collection of indigenous seeds, for example, constitlltes efforts worthy of much greater public support. Here again, the prograrllmes are not likely to make a headway unless the activities of large {oreign and indigenously owned enterprises are eSectively curbed.27
Conclusion
Small entrepreneurs are aware that they are in a situation in which the logic of an economy dominated by large industrial interests provides them with little room to survive, let alone grow.28 tn addition, they are subject to harrassment at the hands of the agencies of the government as frequently as an ordinary citizen. The link or collusion of interests between big industrialists and government agencies is at once apparent to the small enterpreneur. He can see the diSerential treatment accorded to big industrialists on the one hand, and to himself on the other, even when the same rules apply to both. As their xTcry survival is at stake, the sz1all entrepreneur stratum is vitally interested in the renloval of the domination of large industrial interests as it exists today.
Specific measures such as excise reductions on the products of small enterprises and effective reservation of items for production exclusively in small enlerprises, can ease the burden of the small entrepreneur. However, a crucial step is to ensllre that only the deserving benefits frorn these concessions, that is, to zveed out the real from the benami small entrepreneur. 29 The associations of small enterprises are 19 The clearest expression of this is the ubiquitous infringement of the policy reserving items for exclusive production in the small scale sector by transnational and indigenous big enterprises. See S K Goyal, et al, op cit. 20 A company like Hindustan Lever, for instance, has 4000 retail stockists whose turnover varies ftom Rs 25,000 to Rs 2 crors per annum. These stockists supply 300,000 retailers. In addition, the company has "satellite or van markets" which service remote markets, whether from "Patiala in the Punjab or Tiruvalla in Kerala". T Thomas, "Distribution of Essential Commodsties", Speech at Annual General Meeting of Hindustan Lever Limited, 20 June 1975. 21 Thomas offers an ingenious rationale for the marketing practices of large corporations by arguing that without the investment in sales promotion by these corporations, products would lie with reta.il traders longer. These costs of storage wotlld then be passed onto the customer through higher margins. T Thomas, ot cit. As a matter of fact, heavy advertising expenditure and extensive distribution networks serve basically as barriers to entry to competing products. 22 For exhaustive documentation, see S K Goyal, et al, op cit. 23 See Government of India, Ministry of Industrial Development, Report of the C7ommittee for Drafting Legislation for Small Scale Industries, 1972, (Mimeo). 24 Tn the oRicial definition it is stated that an ancillary unit should not be "a subsidiary to or controlled by any large units in regard to the negotiations of contracts for supply of its goods to any large unit". Various guidelines to regulate the relationship between ancillary and parent unit have been specified. 25 See, for example, Economic Times (Bombay!, 14 January 1984. 26 The case concerned a 17trge scale unit, Vindhya Paper Mills vs Union of India, Indian Security Press and Gandhi Brothers Private Limited. Vindhya Paper Mills had been given a license to produce "speciality papers". Gandhi Brothers, who were supplying low grade stamp paper to the Security Press represented to the Ministry of Industries that the license could not be used by Vindhya Paper Mills to produce high grade starrlp paper, as this was a reserved item. Justice Bharucha held that Section 29 B (l) of the IDRA could not be used to reserve items and that all orders reserving items for exclusive procluction would have to be vwithdrawn. See, Financial Express (Madras), 10 February 1983 27 The cases of Balsara vs Colgate -Palmolive, and many others, are well known as cases where small enterprises face extreme competition in products which are supposedly reserved for the small scale sector. However, the crux of the problem in this case, as in many others, while never possible to document, is well known even to senior officials of the Coverment of India. For instance, a member of the staff of Hindustan Lever told the Chief of the Small Enterprises Division ill the Planning Commission that his companv welcomed the efforts of the f)ivision to set up small soap manufacturing units. For once these units had become established and "created a market" for soap, Hindustan Lever would move in, and by underselling the small eIltreprenuer for some time, take over the cost free "market" for soap. 28 Even brief discussions with small ettrepreneurs will produce reactions such as the following by a machine tool manufacturer in Madras: "All this talk about growth is bunkum! As soon as you try to grow they (the banks and other official agencies operating as Organisations) try everything possible to pull you down!"
